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Dr. Besen presented the preliminary conclusions of his
study, "Copying, Reproduction Costs, and the Supply of
Intellectual Property: A Theoretical Approach". He emphasized
that the analysis was still preliminary. First, the study was
only a working draft, and had not received a formal Road review.
Second, the theoretical work was still being refined. Third, no
empirical work has yet been conducted.
Before describing his model, Dr. Besen listed five
assumptions on which he based his work.
1. Originals and copies are perfect substitutes. The
consumer places the same value on both.
2. Producer costs equal the cost of producing the first
copy (F) plus a constant marginal cost (C) for all originals
beyond the first (Q). Thus F + CQ equals producer costs.
3. A fixed number of copies (n) per original are made.
4. Copying costs per original (r) are constant and
positive.
5. A perfect market for copies exists, i.e., all copies
made are sold.
He also assumed that copying would occur irrespective of
whether or not it was legal, because enforcement of copyright is
prohibitively expensive. Dr. Besen's analysis is "exclusively
economic" in its approach to analyzing the effect of copying
technologies on intellectual property.
The basic model begins in a circumstance where no copying
exists; then a technology is introduced which makes copying from
originals possible (see graph 1). When the technology is
introduced, the cost of the copies cannot exceed the cost of
purchasing the original less the gain from selling the resulting
copies since originals and copies are perfectly substitutable.
The effect of introducing the new technology is to increase
the demand for originals, since either their costs can be shared
or copies can be made and sold. The increase in demand for the
originals, however, will be less than proportional to the number
of copies which can be made. (see graph 2). Introducing. copying
generally causes the price of originals to rise. If the cost of
reproduction (r) is less than the cost of producing originals,
then it is in the interest of the producer to allow copying to
take place.
The profit for producers when copying technology exists
exceeds profits in a copyless environment when r is less than c.
In addition, in these circumstances consumer surplus is increased
by copying.
When the cost of reproduction (r) exceeds the cost of
producing extra originals (c), Besen notes that three types of
inefficiencies occur (see graph 3).
1. Output is produced at more than minimun cost, since the
costs are lower if the producer makes additional originals, than
if copies are made.
2. The higher price reduces the number of originals
purchased.
3. This in turn reduces producer profits and may limit the
number of firms supplying originals.
In this situation (r>c) both producers and consumers would
benefit from the banning of copying.
Finally, the products can set the price of originals just
below r, in order to discourage copying. The pricing strategy
that is adopted will depend on the value of r relating to that of
C.
Dr. Besen presented a second model to illustrate the
relationship betwen r, c, and P*, on the price of an original.
He assumed:
1. Two groups of equal size. One group had access to
copying technology and the other had access to originals only.
2. The two groups have identical demand for originals.
3. No copies were made for the restricted group.
4. There is no price discrimination between groups.
Graph 4 illustrates the market demand of the two groups in
the absence of copying. The lower curve P = a - bQ is the curve
for both potential copiers and those who do not copy. The
horizontal sum of the two groups or aggregate is the outer demand
curve Dm. Graph 5 shows the new demand curve for the copying
group. The demand of noncopiers is not affected. Notice in this
case the aggregate demand curve Dm is kinked.
With copying, three types of equilibria are possible given
the demands of the two groups. First, the publisher can raise
the price of originals so high that originals are purchased only
by members of the group engaged in copying. The noncopiers are
worse off since they cease purchasing.
Second, the producer may set his price somewhere below the
price where non-copiers are totally excluded, but above the
initial price of originals.
Third, the producer may set the price of an original just
below r. Besen calls this "limit pricing".
Except where limit pricing is adopted, non-copiers are made
worse off when copying is introduced. Copiers may be better or
worse off. Note, however, that they may be better off even if
copying isinefficient.
Dr. Besen concluded his remarks by saying that "There's not
going to be any general theory of the effect of copying on
intellectual property". He noted that the effects of copying
depended on the commodity demanded, the cost of copying and the
producers' costs. He said his model was a theoretical approach to
how the market might behave given certain conditions.
Ms. Carol Risher initially addressed the need to broaden
some of Besen's assumptions. Her first area was the time
ingredient. When a comsumer is pressed for information, he or
she will pay more for it. The higher cost that ready access
provides must be weighed against the time it takes to make a
copy. Reproducing hard copy on a copier takes much longer than
replicating software, and this time differential has a value for
the consumer.
Next, she asked who pays these costs. In many cases it is
the individual. Increasingly the cost is borne by the
organization or corporation which obtains the information for the
user. With no direct cost to the user, he or she would prefer to
have an original.
The usage of the material is important as well. Ms. Risher
observed that some users acquire copies because they feel they
must have the information in whatever form, while others view the
originals as somehow more definitive. And individuals will be
inclined to pay the higher price of originals when resale is
anticipated. Subsequent usage also influences copying, as in the
use of the cost of computer software.
Ms. Risher was adamant that copyright protection was
enforceable. She cited the recent NYU case in which nine
professors and the university copy shop were sued for not
observing copyright restrictions.
New electronic technologies for the sending and reproduction
of information have the creators of intellectual property up in
arms. Ms. Risher mentioned the optical digital disk as an
example. This technology can scan print material, change it into
machine readable form (digital) and store it on an LP-like disc.
When played, the disc can activate a display screen at a remote
location and trigger a laser printer. Each disc can act as its
own master, enabling copying at an exponential rate. Authors of
works which may be transformed and stored on an optical digital
disc would like to ensure copyright and royalty integrity. They
have determined that their interests and rights would be best
protected by establishing a copyright and royalty agreement
before dissemination of their work through this medium begins.
Ms. Risher agrees that some guarantee should be provided to the
proprietors to allow "dissemination without driving the producer
out of business". One mechanism she suggested was a license
agreement betwen the proprietors and the distributors.
Dr. Besen was given a chance to respond to Ms. Risher's
comments. He admitted that copyright could sometimes be
enforced, as the NYU case illustrates, but he noted that proving
harm from copying is extemely difficult, and that infringement is
often difficult to detect. Ms. Risher's talk did broaden the
scope of discussion to the technical and legal aspects of
copyright infraction, which his paper omits. "My paper is
concerned only with what you can do with price. It assumes
you've done all you can do with attorneys and engineers".
An interesting question came from the floor on the possible
benefit to publishers resulting from issuing free copies of
books. Ms. Risher responded by drawing a distinction between
finite and infinite goods. The toothpaste sample which may come
in the mail is eventually used up. Books are not exhausted, but
last and can be copied, so the damage is greater than the
benefit.
